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Crime, Punishment, and Legal Error: A Review of the Experimental Literature 
 
Kathryn Zeiler1  and Erica Puccetti2 
August 2018 
 
 
1. Introduction 
When individuals violate the law, detection and verification of the violation are 
rarely, if ever, perfect. Before the state can dole out punishment, it must first 
identify a suspect and then produce sufficient evidence to persuade a judge and/or 
jury beyond some threshold level of confidence that the suspect, in fact, violated 
the law. The court might be uncertain that the state has the right person. If the 
suspect is undoubtedly the one who caused the harm, the court might be unsure 
about whether his act constitutes a violation of the law (e.g., whether the suspect 
was, in fact, speeding). The state, given the level of resources allocated to law 
enforcement, might not be able to produce a suspect.  
 Limitations on enforcement resources lead to imperfect detection. Evidence 
production and proof problems cause both mistaken convictions and mistaken 
acquittals.3 Errors have many sources, including hindsight bias,4 lack of complete 
information about the defendant’s possible options and chosen action, 
untrustworthy eyewitness testimony, the admission of impartial evidence in trials,5 
and unwillingness or inability to expend resources on detection,6 among others.7 
We focus here not on the sources of errors, but rather on their effects on deterrence 
and punishment policy. 8  Our purpose is to briefly summarize the theoretical 
                                            
1  Nancy Barton Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
kzeiler@bu.edu. Thanks to Tim Friehe, Nuno Garoupa, Murat Mungan, and JJ Prescott, for 
helpful comments and suggestions.  
2 Boston University School of Law, Class of 2019. 
3 Lack of detection of wrongdoing might be viewed as a type of mistaken acquittal. We 
note, however, that some analyses view these two phenomena as importantly distinct from 
one another. In addition, the use of “type I” and “type II” errors is common in the 
literature, although the terms are used inconsistently. For this reason, we prefer “mistaken 
conviction” and “mistaken acquittal.” 
4 See, for example, Fischoff 1975; Baron and Hershey 1988; Casper, Benedict, and Perry 
1989. 
5 See, for example, Landsman and Rakos 1994; Kassin and Sommers 1997. 
6 See, for example, Becker 1968.  
7 See Gould and Leo 2010. 
8 We also do not review the substantial literature related to the normative questions around 
error rates. See, for example, Volokh  1997.  
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literature that studies the effects of legal errors on crime and punishment rates, and 
to critically review studies that report on experiments conducted to test such 
theories.9 The theoretical literature includes analyses of both criminal law and civil 
law violations, and so we cover both here.10  
 Experimentalists have tested relevant theories in a variety of contexts. We limit 
our review to theft game experiments, where players handing out punishments are 
not victims of the crime. Theft game players are assigned to just one role, either 
judge or potential law violator (citizen, criminal, and so on). Fines are not costly to 
judges, at least in monetary terms.11 This rules out experiments using public goods 
games that allow players to impose costly punishment on non-contributors.   
 Researchers who attempt to test theories using field data face formidable 
obstacles. Much of what is required is unobservable. Data on the number of crimes 
committed, the amount of resources and effort spent on detection, and rates of 
wrongful convictions and acquittals are impossible to observe in the field. The lack 
of randomization of detection efforts, punishment severity, and burdens of proof 
lead to troublesome selection effects. Despite these difficulties, a great deal of field 
research has been conducted.12 Given the limitations of the field, data generated in 
the lab can help to increase confidence, or call into question, theories constructed 
to explain and predict behavior. 
 While the lab is well suited to solve some of the identification problems that 
plague researchers working in the field, it is not a perfect tool by any means. It 
comes with its own substantial limitations. For example, it’s impossible to impose 
severe levels of punishment, such as hefty fines that go well beyond endowments 
handed out in the lab. Imprisonment of any significant duration is certainly not an 
option. For this reason, it’s impossible to test theories that assume or predict severe 
penalties such as fines equal to the convict’s total wealth. Even testing the effects of 
varying substantial fines is difficult. At most (at least in the U.S.), we are limited to 
taking only (or not much beyond) what the subject earned or was given during the 
experiment and ending the subject’s ability to gain additional payouts during the 
experiment. This and other limitations are discussed, and their implications are 
explored. 
 This is not the first review of the experimental literature. Engel (2016) 
summarizes a wide array of experiments. Our review is much narrower in scope 
and offers a critical perspective. We attempt to synthesize experimental results to 
                                            
9 We draw on theoretical literature summaries by Garoupa (1997) and Prescott (2016). 
10 We use language associated with crimes throughout the review. The reader should read 
the terms broadly—we mean them to encompass civil law violations as well. 
11  Some have studied the effects of allowing law enforcers to profit from delivering 
punishment. See, for example, Xiao and Tan (2014). 
12 See, for example, Levitt and Miles 2007; Levitt and Miles 2006. 
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get a sense of the main take-aways and to generate a roadmap for further 
exploration in the lab.  
 Part 2 summarizes theories offered to explain and predict how imperfect 
detection and guilt-determination errors affect crime and punishment rates. Part 3 
summaries, synthesizes and critiques experimental studies designed to test the 
theories. Part 4 catalogs, in broad terms, where we are and offers ideas for 
potentially fruitful avenues for continued exploration in the lab. 
 
2. Theory 
 
2.1. Becker’s Theory of Optimal Enforcement and Early Responses 
 
According to standard economics models, one will choose to violate a legal rule if 
one’s expected benefits of doing so outweigh the expected costs.13 Perhaps the 
most salient expected cost is punishment, the likelihood of which depends on three 
factors: detection, successful prosecution, and punishment enforcement. If the 
judicial system is able to perfectly determine guilt and detection always leads to 
prosecution, then one will expect to suffer the cost of punishment if (1) one violates 
a legal rule, (2) that violation is detected, and (3) punishment is enforced.14 Becker 
(1968, n.55) suggested that enforcement costs could be saved by increasing the 
severity of punishment beyond the harm resulting from the violation.15 In effect, this 
implies that enforcers can reduce total social costs by reducing enforcement costs 
to near zero. While reducing enforcement would otherwise greatly increase the 
likelihood of mistaken acquittal (in the form of imperfect detection), increasing 
punishment severity maintains the expected cost of crime, which acts to keep 
would-be criminals in line. 
 Becker’s approach led to a flurry of responses, all of which claimed that 
Becker’s analysis missed crucial factors. Harris (1970), for example, argued that 
efficient crime policy must account for social costs imposed both by mistaken 
convictions and mistaken acquittals. Becker suggests increasing the probability of 
detection to reduce losses from crime or, if doing so is costly, imposing harsher 
punishment. If, however, social costs arise from unjust punishment and detection 
mechanisms are not perfect, Harris argues that these social costs must be balanced 
against the costs of crime and might call for reduced levels of detection and 
punishment and greater legal safeguards to prevent mistaken conviction. In other 
words, as long as uncertainty over guilt exists, justifying extreme punishment is 
                                            
13 See, for example, Becker (1968), which applies standard economics concepts to crime. 
14 We use “guilt” to refer both to violation of criminal or civil laws. 
15 Becker (1968) did not take up the issue of guilt determination errors.  
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difficult. 16  Erlich (1982) points out distributional considerations missing from 
Becker’s (1968) analysis. For example, if detection is unlikely and punishment 
severe, most will face no punishment and the few unlucky detected criminals will 
pay a huge cost. Erlich refers to this as ex post inequality. Like Harris, he also 
argues that any analysis of optimal crime policy must include the costs of mistaken 
convictions.  
 The following subsection summaries a number of theoretical models that more 
formally analyze the implications of mistaken convictions. 
 
2.2. Early Theories Of Mistaken Convictions 
 
A number of theorists extended Becker’s model to illuminate the implications of 
mistaken convictions. Stigler (1970) was perhaps the first to point out that 
mistakenly punishing the innocent might result in higher crime rates. In the 
extreme, if the innocent will be punished with certainty, then committing crimes 
that produce benefits of any size is optimal. More generally, the risk of being 
mistakenly punished decreases the marginal benefits of maintaining one’s 
innocence. Stigler also analyzed the relationship between punishment severity and 
choice over crimes. He noted that when criminals chose from a continuum of 
crimes, higher punishments might compel more harmful crimes (e.g., if my hand 
will be cut off when I’m caught stealing $5, I might as well steal $5,000).17 The 
generality of this result, Stigler notes, depends on actions potential victims might 
take to prevent crime. Specifically, when criminals assess their options, they 
consider steps owners of relatively large sums of cash might take to deter theft. 
Stigler notes that self-protection mechanisms might reduce the likelihood of high-
dollar crimes. 
 Rubinfeld and Sappington (1987) consider the use of policy to improve the 
accuracy of guilt determinations. Their model assumes defendants use trials to 
signal their innocence or guilt. They find that optimal choices of standards of proof 
and punishment severity can minimize the probability of mistaken convictions and 
mistaken acquittals and total litigation costs of defendants. They employ a standard 
signaling model to show that these two policy levers can be used to increase the 
court’s ability to infer guilt or innocence from defendants’ litigation efforts. 
 Grady (1983) analyzed the effects of perceived error in court guilt 
determinations on the rate of legal rule violations. He focused not on judicial error 
                                            
16 Harris also points out the complexities that arise from the fact that different classes of 
persons might perceive costs of punishment and costs of crime differently.  
17 Malik (1990) points out that we can solve this problem by lowering the probability of 
detection as punishment severity is increased. Assuming risk neutrality, we can use both 
levers simultaneously to keep the expected cost of crime constant but lower detection 
costs. For more on the impact of risk preferences see infra.  
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but on potential litigant error in predicting court determinations of violations of 
duties of care. He assumes that courts do not err in determining breach, but that 
potential injurers sometimes fail to perfectly predict whether their choice of 
precautions will trigger a court determination of breach in the event an injury 
occurs and a negligence suit is pursued. Unlike previous models, his analysis 
predicts that, assuming such errors, efficient precaution taking will not be 
encouraged by the standard negligence rule adopted in economic models, which 
assumes that the defendant breaches his duty of care if his chosen precaution falls 
below the level of precaution that minimizes the sum of expected harm and 
precaution cost. Grady (1983, 821) proposes a revised rule aimed at encouraging 
efficient choices over precautions, a rule he claims courts actually apply in 
practice.18 
 Png (1986) analyzes errors courts make in determining guilt, considering their 
effects both on behavior given a decision to engage in risky activity and on the 
decision whether to engage in a risky activity in the first instance. Png assumes a 
positive probability of both wrongful acquittals and wrongful convictions, that 
precautions are costly, and that the choice over precautions is binary. Assuming 
risk neutrality, Png finds that optimal choices over both precautions and activity 
levels can be encouraged by increasing damages and by offering a subsidy for (or 
imposing a tax on) activities, depending on the probabilities of wrongful 
convictions and acquittals. Under this set of assumptions, he finds that both 
wrongful acquittals and wrongful convictions reduce deterrence and thus compel 
an increase in punishment severity (in other words, increased damages).19 The logic 
behind wrongful acquittals is straightforward—the lower one’s likelihood of 
detection or conviction given detection, the more severe the punishment must be 
to push expected costs of rule violation above expected benefits. The connection 
between wrongful convictions and deterrence is consistent with Stigler’s (1970) 
intuition. As the chance of a wrongful conviction increases, the marginal cost of 
violating the law decreases. Ignoring social costs of wrongful convictions, Png 
argues that the possibility of wrongful conviction suggests that Becker’s 
recommended increase in punishment severity to account for low detection rates 
might not go far enough. To the extent that punishment can be made even more 
severe, enforcers should increase its severity to account for the possibility of 
wrongful convictions. 
                                            
18 The details of the rule, which hinge on a complex relationship between the tort elements 
of breach and causation, are beyond the scope of our analysis. See Polinsky and Shavell 
[2000] for a summary of results related to civil liability contexts. 
19 Png assumes that the two types of errors affect deterrence in the same way. Polinsky and 
Shavell (2000), in their summary of the literature on optimal enforcement in the face of 
imperfect detection and guilt-determination errors, report this result among others 
summarized here. Polinsky and Shavell (2007) provide a similar summary. 
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 Kaplow and Shavell (1994) develop a model to examine optimal enforcer 
choices over sanctions and methods to improve accuracy of both conviction and 
acquittal decisions. Their insight is that detection rates and accuracy rates are 
substitutes in the battle to reduce crime rates; thus, optimal law enforcement will 
depend on the relative costs of increasing detection and increasing accuracy. The 
model produces two main results. First, like Becker (1968), they find that increasing 
costless sanctions will maintain deterrence while allowing detection and judicial 
accuracy cost savings. While Becker recognizes potential limits on sanctions, 
Kaplow and Shavell argue that, if imposing sanctions is costless (for example, 
imposing an easy-to-collect fine), the optimal sanction is the maximal feasible 
sanction—the entire wealth of the convict.20 Second, if sanctions are costly (for 
example, a prison term), then the enforcer should increase accuracy and reduce 
enforcement costs relative to a costless sanction environment. Like Png (1986), 
Kaplow and Shavell ignore social costs of wrongful convictions. 
 Around the same time, a number of studies considered wrinkles that might alter 
basic predictions of the early models incorporating mistaken convictions. The 
following subsection highlights a number of refinements. 
   
2.3. Enforcement Model Refinements 
 
2.2.1. Risk Preferences 
 
Polinsky and Shavell (1979) analyze the effects of risk aversion on choices over 
whether to comply with legal standards. They show that any adjustment to 
punishment to account for a positive probability of wrongful acquittal (in the form 
of failed detection) needs to account for the risk preferences of potential law 
violators. For example, if potential violators are risk averse, increases to damages to 
account for a low probability of detection need not be as high as Becker (1968) 
suggests based on the assumption of risk neutrality.21 In fact, by holding back on 
damages, Polinsky and Shavell argue that we gain social value by reducing the cost 
of bearing risk imposed on potential violators. They also find that, if both wrongful 
convictions and wrongful acquittals are possible, risk aversion leads to ambiguous 
results on the optimal sanction. 
 
2.2.2. Jury Preferences for Justice 
 
                                            
20 Becker (1968, n.55) admits that sanctions in excess of the value of the harm are 
necessary when the probability of detection is less than 1. Becker (1968, 195) explicitly 
rejects, however, tying the penalty to the convict’s wealth.  
21 Kaplow and Shavell (1994) find a similar result. They also find that optimal sanctions 
might rise or fall as mistaken conviction and acquittal rates increase. 
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Until the early-90s, economic analyses of criminal law and deterrence focused 
mostly on choices over enforcement expenditures and severity of sanctions by 
officials aiming to minimize the sum of enforcement costs and costs imposed by 
criminals on their victims. Andreoni (1991) explored the effect of severe 
punishment on the willingness of judges and jurors to convict when guilt is 
uncertain. Specifically, Andreoni noted that severe penalties might make 
conviction less likely because jurors are reluctant to impose harsh punishments in 
the face of uncertainty about guilt, especially in cases where the burden of proof is 
high (for example, beyond a reasonable doubt). Such reluctance changes the 
enforcer’s calculus. Increasing the severity of punishment given such reluctance to 
convict might lead to lower convictions rates and, consequently, higher violation 
rates. This calls into question Bentham’s (1914) general claim that regulators and 
courts should increase penalty severity to balance the effects of low detection 
rates.22 
 Schrag and Scotchmer (1994) extended the standard model by exploring 
potentially divergent objective functions of different parties involved in the 
enforcement apparatus. In particular, they suggest that jurors might care more 
about justice than they do about deterrence, which could compel them to apply a 
high evidentiary standard (regardless of the legal standard) when deciding guilt. 
They assume that justice is maximized when the likelihood of wrongful conviction 
is minimized; thus, jurors apply high evidentiary standards to reduce the 
probability of convicting the innocent. They offer an extreme example to make the 
point. If only one person had an opportunity to commit a perpetrated crime, but the 
jury is uncertain about who committed it, to maximize deterrence it should convict 
anyone charged.23  This result follows from Png’s (1994) insight that mistaken 
convictions decrease deterrence; but, as Schrag and Scotchmer point out, this is 
true only for those with an opportunity to commit the crime. The choices of those 
without an opportunity to commit the crime will not be affected by the possibility 
of wrongful conviction. If, however, jurors aim not to deter but to minimize 
wrongful convictions instead, then they will resist convicting, and deterrence will 
be suboptimal. 24  They propose allowing into evidence what courts generally 
                                            
22  Feess and Wohlschlegel (2009, 71) formalize this claim and find that “deterrence 
maximizing punishments are increasing in the quality of information the jury gets.” 
23 Schrag and Scotchmer refer to these types of crimes as “exclusive.” They also consider 
non-exclusive crimes (those that many have an opportunity to commit). For these types of 
crimes, wrongful convictions decrease the deterrent effect to a larger extent than for 
exclusive crimes.  They also consider environments populated by two different types of 
citizens, some who enjoy high benefits from crime and others who gain less in benefits. 
24 They assume that the jury’s objective function, which focuses on justice, is not in line 
with society’s objective function, which focuses on deterrence. They also explore the 
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consider prejudicial information about the defendant’s character, and they suggest 
that if those charged are more likely to have criminal records, the information 
about character will increase the conviction rate and, as a result, increase 
deterrence.25 
 
2.2.3. Criminal Reactions to Enforcement Policies 
 
 Calfee and Craswell (1984) call attention to the link between the law violator’s 
actions and the likelihood of being found guilty.26 They predict, like others, that 
increases in punishment severity might alleviate the undesirable effects of wrongful 
acquittals and failed detection on deterrence. In cases where the risk creators’ 
actions are tied to the likelihood of being found guilty, however, the authors 
predict that risk creators will over-comply when they are uncertain about whether 
they will be held accountable. Increasing the severity of punishment, they warn, 
only exacerbates this inefficiency. Calfee and Craswell show that Bentham’s (1914) 
argument that punishment should always be increased to reflect the likelihood of 
non-detection is valid only when certain conditions hold.27 When the potential 
injurer chooses from a set of continuous actions, such as choosing a driving speed, 
and the potential injurer’s choice affects the likelihood of a guilt determination 
such that risk creators are encouraged to over-comply, then increasing penalties to 
compensate for uncertainty in detection might lead to even higher levels of over-
compliance. They, like Grady (1983), suggest changing legal rules to directly 
reduce uncertainty, such as employing bright line rules instead of standards, 
although they caution that such rule changes might trigger other costs. 
                                                                                                                                  
implications of juries that are more likely to convict those with criminal records in an effort 
to punish them for undetected crimes. 
25 For a comprehensive analysis of the role of evidentiary rules in guilt determination 
errors, see Posner [1999]. Posner assumes that errors in guilt determinations impose a 
social cost and that costly expenditures to procure evidence reduce the likelihood of such 
errors. He invokes the intuition from Png (1986) that both wrongful acquittals and wrongful 
convictions decrease the deterrent effects of the law, and, like Kaplow and Shavell (1994), 
predicts that greater accuracy in guilt determinations will enhance deterrence. 
26 In addition to legal system errors, they consider other sources of uncertainty including 
mistaken predictions about where the court will set the legal standard, whether a legal 
proceeding will be pursued, and the magnitude of the punishment. Shavell (2009) 
develops this point further. [search for second Calfee and Craswell article that produces a 
similar result] 
27 The conditions are: (1) when the potential injurer makes an either/or choice rather than a 
choice from a continuum with an interior optimal point; (2) when the choice is from a 
continuum and the choice is independent of the probability of detection and litigation; and 
(3) given a set of choice conditions, under-compliance is more likely than over-compliance 
(Calfee and Craswell 1984, 996).  
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 Malik (1990) considers reactions by criminals to severe penalties and their 
implications for optimal crime policy. [more here] 
 
2.2.4. Distinguishing Error Type 
 
 Strandburg (2002)—assumes that errors depend on one another; increase in 
accuracy has ambiguous effects on deterrence. [more here] 
 Similar to Schrag and Scotchmer’s (1994) basic intuitions related to exclusive 
crimes (that is, the choices of those without opportunities to commit the considered 
crime will not be impacted by the probability of wrongful conviction), Lando 
(2006) draws a distinction between two different sources of wrongful conviction for 
nonexclusive crimes (in other words, everyone has an opportunity to commit the 
crime). The first source is a court finding that the defendant violated the law while 
acting, when in fact his action complied with the law (“mistaken act evaluation”). 
In this case, the usual result holds if the act is binary.28 When the court is mistaken 
about the wrongfulness of the act, both mistaken conviction and mistaken acquittal 
reduce deterrence. The second source is a court finding that the defendant 
committed a criminal act that was actually committed by someone else (“mistaken 
identity”). When the court is mistaken about identity and the probability of 
mistaken act evaluation is zero, mistaken convictions based on an identity error 
will not affect choices of those who might be mistaken for the perpetrator. This is 
because mistaken conviction based on identity is equally likely both when one 
violates the law and when one decides to comply. Importantly, Lando implicitly 
assumes that the likelihood that one will be mistakenly acquitted is independent of 
the likelihood of someone else being mistakenly convicted of one’s crime. Lando, 
thus, highlights the importance of considering the error type when analyzing the 
effects of errors on deterrence. 
 Garoupa and Rizzolli (2011) call into question Lando’s conclusion. They point 
out that whenever a misidentified defendant is mistakenly convicted, the actual 
perpetrator is mistakenly acquitted. Thus, the probability of mistaken acquittal is a 
function of the likelihood that someone else will be found guilty of one’s crime. In 
the extreme, if the jury always convicts the wrong person, then everyone who 
benefits from committing a crime will commit it. Garoupa and Rizzolli therefore 
                                            
28 The act is binary if the choice set is {commit the act, do not commit the act}. Lando 
reminds us of Calfee and Craswell’s (1986) qualification related to continuous choice sets 
(for example, how fast to drive). In these cases, if the choice impacts the likelihood of guilt, 
then actors are encouraged to be overly cautious. Mistaken guilt determinations exacerbate 
this effect.  
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conclude that convictions based on mistaken identities will, in fact, reduce 
deterrence.29  
 
 
3. Experiments (and Theory Development) 
 
3.1. Criminal Preferences 
 
Some of the first experiments designed to explore reactions to changes in the 
likelihood of detection brought to light factors beyond expected punishment that 
might keep potential law violators in line.  
 In one of the first lab experiments in the field, Alm, McClelland, and Schultze 
(1992) considered tax evasion rates given low levels of detection and found 
evidence of overestimation of low detection rates and a willingness to comply due 
to preferences for the provision of public goods. Subjects were endowed with 
various incomes and told to decide how much income to report. They were told 
that they must pay a tax on all reported income and that, with some positive 
probability that varied within subject across multiple rounds, a penalty equal to 
fifteen times the unpaid tax would be imposed if they did not report all income. To 
test whether subjects might be influenced by the public-goods benefits that arise 
from taxes, all collected taxes and penalties were put into a group fund, increased 
by some multiple, and distributed equally among all subjects at the end of each 
round. To avoid introducing negative connotations, the loaded words “evasion” 
and “tax compliance” were not used during the main experiment.30 
 It is important to note at the outset that the design features deviate from the 
assumptions of the general deterrence models. First, evidence suggests that subjects 
view money given to them by the experimenter as different from their own money. 
This “house money effect” can reduce the disutility subjects experience when they 
lose amounts during the experiment.31 Second, penalties are limited by the amounts 
subjects obtain during the experiment. General experimental protocol frowns upon 
(and in some cases forbids) the taking of money not endowed during the 
                                            
29 Garoupa and Rizzolli employ an equilibrium model of the supply of and demand for 
errors to derive their conclusion, though it seems that simply assuming the likelihood of a 
wrongful acquittal is a function of the likelihood of a wrongful conviction of another for 
one’s crimes is sufficient to obtain the result. 
30 Some treatments were run with the loaded terminology to test for its effects, however, 
and no differences in choices were observed. This suggests that results reported in previous 
experiments that used the loaded terms might not have been tainted in any way by the 
suggestive language.  
31 Cite to basic house money effect literature. 
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experiment.32 Experiments in such environments are not effective tests of theories 
that assume criminal penalties go beyond gains from the crime that triggered the 
penalty. 
 The results suggest that at least some individuals place excessive weight on low 
probability events as assumed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and that some 
pay taxes because they value public goods funded by tax revenues. When the 
subjects were told that the probability of detection was zero, average group 
compliance was 20%, suggesting forces other than probability overweighting were 
at play. The authors do not tell us whether subject choices and payouts were 
anonymous. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that subject choices were at 
least partly driven by the desire to avoid signaling to the experimenters or other 
subjects a willingness to break the law. That said, the results suggest that choices 
might be driven at least in part by systematic overestimation of low probabilities of 
detection and preferences over public goods produced through compliance. While 
the experiment environment is not in line with assumptions of theories of crime 
and punishment, which assume that criminals pay penalties out of total wealth and 
not just the profits from their crimes, the results provide some insight into factors 
that might influence criminals’ choices. 
 Block and Gerety (1995) report results suggesting that, in the face of uncertain 
likelihood and severity of punishment, convicts react differently from a deterrence 
standpoint from the general population. Becker (1968) and others have noted that 
convicts tend to be risk seeking. In contrast, ample experimental evidence shows 
that the general population is risk averse. This implies that convicts, when deciding 
whether to commit a crime, might be more sensitive to changes in the certainty of 
punishment than to its severity, while the general population might be relatively 
more sensitive to changes in punishment severity.  
Block and Gerety (1995) collected data from two samples, one drawn from a 
prisoner population and another from a college student population. All subjects 
participated as sellers in binding auctions over multiple rounds. Subjects were 
assigned costs of production—the same across all subjects—and asked to report the 
lowest price at which they would be willing to sell a “make-believe commodity.” 
The seller reporting the lowest price sold a number of units indicated by a 
predetermined demand function and received compensation equal to the number 
of units demanded multiplied by the per-unit profit (price minus the per-unit 
production cost). All other subjects received nothing. In some rounds, subjects 
were allowed to communicate, which provided an opportunity to collude. In 
others, subjects could communicate with each other but were told they would 
                                            
32 Generally, human subjects committees in the U.S. forbid net experimental earnings to be 
negative. [add cite] Journals outside the U.S., however, do not always require authors to 
obtain human subjects committee approval, and negative payoffs are, therefore, possible 
(see, for example, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004, 67).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250393 
Note: This is an incomplete working draft. Please do not cite without authors’ 
permission. 
 
 12 
suffer a monetary penalty of some (varying) size with some (varying) probability if 
the experimenter detected collusion (that is, if the reported prices exceeded the 
cost of production). 33  The findings supported the assumptions related to risk 
preference differentials between prisoners and students. In the rounds forbidding 
communication, prices converged to the production cost. In the unpunished 
collusion rounds, prices generally converged to the monopoly price, implying that 
subjects successfully colluded. In rounds imposing varying punishment with 
varying probability, students generally displayed aversion to risk while the 
prisoners engaged in risk-seeking behavior, in line with predicted differences. Thus, 
the results suggest the existence of heterogeneous risk preferences when wrongful 
acquittal is possible.34  
 Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2002) designed an experiment to study 
choices in environments in which bribes are possible. They focused on three 
drivers of behavior: beliefs over reciprocity (in other words, if the enforcer is 
bribed, he will reciprocate), known costs imposed on third parties (citizens incur 
corruption costs), and fear of detection and punishment.35 To test other-regarding 
preferences, bribers in some treatments were told that all other subjects 
participating in the experiment would suffer a small loss if a bribe were accepted. 
To test fear of punishment, bribers in some treatments were told that they faced a 
0.003 probability of detection, which would result in a loss of all money made 
during the experiment and the end of opportunities to earn more during the 
experiment. Subjects did not know when others were detected and essentially 
ejected from future rounds, and payouts were made anonymously at the end of the 
experiment. The results reject the hypothesis that other-regarding preferences will 
reduce bribes. Costs imposed on others did not affect the crime rate. On the 
punishment front, the possible loss of all winnings reduced (over all rounds) the 
number of bribes despite the overall low probability of sudden death 36  and 
subjects’ underestimation of the probability of detection elicited using surveys 
administered after all treatments. Based on subject choices and survey responses, 
                                            
33 Relatively hefty punishments were possible because these rounds followed rounds in 
which subjects were given opportunities to engage in unpunished collusion and 
accumulate winnings. Punishment, however, never exceeded the amount of money gained 
from “criminal” activities during the experiment. Thus, the conditions of the experiment 
diverge from the assumptions of the tested theories. 
34 The experiment does not test the deterrent effects of wrongful conviction. 
35 Bribers were randomly matched with “public officials,” and each matched pair engaged 
in thirty consecutive rounds with payoffs accumulating over rounds.  
36 The probability of sudden death over all rounds was 0.086.  
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the authors concluded that deterrence was driven by severity of the punishment as 
opposed to the likelihood of detection.37 
 
3.2. Wrongful Conviction v. Wrongful Acquittal 
 
 Basic theories (for example, Png 1986) predict that risk neutral citizens react to 
wrongful convictions rates and wrongful acquittal rates in the same way. Rizzolli 
and Stanca (2012) conducted an experiment (1) to test Png’s claim, and (2) to study 
what might explain disparities in reactions if they exist. They offered three potential 
explanations for disparities: risk aversion, loss aversion, and mistaken conviction 
aversion.38 Rizzolli and Stanca designed two experimental studies—one within-
subjects and another between-subjects 39 —in which subjects, under various 
probabilities of wrongful conviction and acquittal, chose whether (anonymously) to 
take money from another randomly matched subject.40 Both subjects in the pair 
were given endowments, which were not common knowledge.41  One subject 
decided whether to take a fixed amount, g, from the other. If convicted, the subject 
paid a fixed sanction, f, but kept g.42 
 The results from the within-subject experiment provide mixed support for Png’s 
theory. In Treatment 1, subjects (n = 48) faced no chance of a wrongful conviction 
or acquittal. All theories predict indifference between taking and not taking. Just 
over 29% of subjects took g. In Treatment 2, the probability of a wrongful acquittal 
increased to 0.5. In Treatment 3, the probability of a wrongful conviction increased 
to 0.5. In Treatment 4, the probability of a wrongful acquittal and a wrongful 
                                            
37  The authors did not report correlations between individual underestimation of 
probabilities and choices over whether to bribe. This would have increased our confidence 
in the authors’ conclusion. 
38 Aversion to wrongful convictions implies that individuals tend to follow the law because 
it is the right thing to do, and not merely because it is optimal for them to abide by the 
rules. Thus, wrongful convictions impose a greater cost relative to wrongful acquittals 
because they trigger a “loss of guidance” and “motivational crowding out.” 
39 The between-subjects experiment rules out order effects. Each subject participated in just 
one treatment. 
40 No feedback was provided to subjects between rounds in the within-subject experiment. 
41 This helps to rule out inequity aversion as an explanation for observed choices. The 
authors ran additional tests to determine whether subjects might have assumed all 
endowments were the same and acted in a way to avoid inequity in payouts. They find no 
evidence of this.  
42 Subjects were undergraduate students. All subjects read instructions for both roles and 
had to pass a test of understanding to continue. Perfect stranger matching was used from 
round to round so that no subject was matched with any other subject more than once. 
Each player played the role of the thief in every round and payouts were determined by 
randomly choosing which player was the actual thief.  
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conviction were 0.25. In all treatments, in line with every theory, the rate of taking 
increased substantially relative to treatment 1. Tests of Png’s predictions failed to 
offer support. Theft rates were higher when one error rate increased relative to both 
(Treatment 2 v. Treatment 4 and Treatment 3 v. Treatment 4). In addition, the theft 
rate was higher (at the 10% level) when the wrongful conviction rate increased 
alone relative to an increase solely in the wrongful acquittal rate (Treatment 2 v. 
Treatment 3). Thus, contrary to Png’s prediction, individuals tend to react 
differently to different types and combinations of errors.  
 
Figure 1: Within-Subject Crime Rates from Rizzolli and Stanca (2012) 
 
 
  Rizzolli and Stanca designed Treatments 5 and 6 to separate the three possible 
explanations for varying effects of different error types: risk aversion, loss aversion, 
and wrongful conviction aversion. Treatment 5 was identical to Treatment 2, 
except that the thief received no endowment. Treatment 6 was the same as 
Treatment 3, except the thief received an endowment twice as large.  Thus, 
Treatments 2 and 6 and Treatments 3 and 5 were identical with respect to the 
expected gains from theft. In the between-subjects experiment (which controls for 
order effects), the crime rate is higher when wrongful conviction alone is possible 
relative to only wrongful acquittal, consistent with the within-subjects result. When 
the initial endowment is changed to control for expected gains from theft, however, 
the difference disappears. This supports risk aversion as an explanation for the 
difference in crime rates between Treatments 2 and 3.43 Given evidence suggesting 
                                            
43 The authors argue that these results also rule out wrongful conviction aversion and loss 
aversion as possible explanations for the different outcomes in Treatments 2 and 3. 
Presumably, if individuals were averse to wrongful convictions, we should observe 
differences between Treatments 2 and 6 and between Treatments 3 and 5 because, even 
though the expected marginal gain from taking is the same, individuals would resist taking 
when the probability of a wrongful conviction is higher to avoid the disutility that arises 
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convicts are risk loving relative to the general population (see, for example, Block 
and Gerety 1995), however, evidence in support of theories that assume risk 
aversion are of limited use for policy applications.  
 
 
Figure 2: Between-Subject Crime Rates from Rizzolli and Stanca (2012) 
 
 
 
Expected utility expressions indicate marginal gain from stealing given endowment. 
T2 and T6 (and T3 and T5) are identical except for probabilities of wrongful 
conviction and acquittal.  
 
3.3. Enforcer Choices 
 
Several experiments test predictions related to enforcer choices and the influence 
of those choices on crime rates. 
 Rauhut (2009) was one of the first to predict behavior of citizens and law 
enforcers using a game theoretic model assuming risk neutrality. The model 
assumes the enforcer pays some fixed cost of detection and earns a positive reward 
upon detection, and the citizen receives a payoff upon accomplishing an 
                                                                                                                                  
from the aversion. Similarly, Rizzolli and Stanca argue that if individuals were loss averse, 
we would observe lower crime rates in Treatment 5 relative to Treatment 3 and Treatment 
2 relative to Treatment 6. This is not the case, however. Predictions will depend on 
whether taking resets one’s reference point. If it does not, then one will always take in 
Treatments 3 and 5 (taking avoids the chance of a loss from a wrongful conviction in T3, 
and taking provides an opportunity to keep a gain in T5). If it does, then one will never 
take in Treatments 3 and 5 (not taking avoids a sure loss in T3 and a chance of a loss in 
T5). Although the predictions are flawed, the data fail to support loss aversion.  
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undetected taking44 and suffers punishment if detected. The probabilities of crime 
and detection arise as Nash equilibrium mixed strategies—the enforcer sets the 
detection rate to keep the citizen indifferent between stealing and not stealing, and 
the citizen sets the taking rate to keep enforcers indifferent between inspecting and 
not inspecting. The model predicts that (1) as punishment severity increases, 
enforcers are less likely to expend resources to detect, and (2) severity of 
punishment has no effect on crime rates.  
 Rauhut conducted an experiment to test these predictions. A total of 196 
subjects participated in one of ten sessions.45 First, all subjects earned money by 
taking a general knowledge quiz.46 Next, all subjects read instructions for roles of 
“players” and “inspectors” and were tested for understanding. Each subject was 
randomly assigned to the role of player or inspector. After participating in two 
practice rounds, each subject engaged in thirty binding rounds. In each round, 
each player was anonymously matched with another different player, and both 
players could decide to take money from the other. Each player was also matched 
with an inspector (a different inspector each round), and each inspector decided 
whether to inspect without knowledge of whether the player took from the other 
player. In one experiment, punishment was light in periods 1-15 and heavy in 
periods 16-30. In a second experiment, punishment was heavy in the first half and 
light in the second. After each round, each player learns whether the other player 
took from her, whether the inspector inspected and, if she took, whether she was 
punished. Each inspector learned whether the player attempted to take. Payoffs 
were tallied and accumulated from round to round.  
 The results generally fail to support the models’ predictions. Given the 
parameters chosen, the expected inspection rate was 80% in the low punishment 
rounds and 20% in the high punishment rounds. The model predicts that, as 
punishment severity changes, the inspector will adjust the inspection rate to keep 
the player indifferent between taking and not taking. The expected crime rate, 
therefore, was 50% in all rounds (again, partly a function of the parameters 
chosen). Static regression results suggest that increasing punishment severity 
reduces both inspection (in line with the static prediction) and theft (against the 
prediction).47 Rauhut also derived predictions using a dynamic learning model. The 
model assumes that subjects begin with initial expectations and update their priors 
as they gain experience during the experiment. Figure 3 reports average behavior 
                                            
44 Transfers due to taking are inefficient in the sense that the payoff to the criminal is some 
fraction of the value to the original owner. 
45 72% of subjects were female due to their overrepresentation in the subject pool drawn 
from students enrolled in the University of Leipzig.  
46 This design feature is meant to mitigate house money effects.  
47 Rauhut derived estimates using a linear random intercept model, clustering standard 
errors on session and subject. Both effects are significant at the 0.1% level. 
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(open and closed connected circles) across rounds in Experiment 1 (low 
punishment to high punishment) and Experiment 2 (high punishment to low 
punishment). The thick grey lines are the static Nash Equilibrium predictions. The 
dotted and solid trends represent predictions from two different learning models.48 
Citizens seem to react to changes in punishment severity, adjusting theft rates 
downward when severity increases and upward when they decrease. The same is 
true for inspection rates only when citizens face low punishment severity in the first 
rounds and high severity punishment in later rounds. Inspection rates react less 
sharply when more severe punishment is meted out in the first rounds, even as theft 
rates initially increase. 
 To summarize, the results support static predictions that increased severity of 
punishment lowers inspection rates. Static predictions of stable crime rates are not 
supported, however. Dynamic models predict that subjects will react much more 
strongly to punishment incentives than they actually do. Adaptation is slower than 
predicted. It is possible that over a higher number of rounds, choices would 
confirm the dynamic predictions. 
 
Figure 3: Results from Rauhut (2009) 
 
 
 
                                            
48 The solid curves are predictions from the unilateral learning model, which uses actual 
experiment data and assumes that subjects update beliefs using actual outcomes. The 
dotted curves represent predictions from a bilateral learning model, which uses actual data 
only from the first round (Round 0) and assumes perfect updating given simulated crime 
and inspection decisions. The bilateral learning model allows comparisons of subjects with 
perfect updaters who start out with the subjects’ priors. 
In both experiments, inspec ors start with moderate inspection activ-
ities – not very high and not very low. However, the mixed Nash equi-
libria predict more extreme inspection activities – higher inspection
rates for low punishment and lower inspection rates for high punish-
ment. This implies that both inspectees and inspectors should increase
their activities for low punishment and decrease their activities for high
punishment.
The solid lines in figure 4 show the predicted learning curves of the
unilateral learning model. More specifically, they show the optimal adap-
tion of ego for the actually experienced behavior of alter in the
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Figure 4. Humans learn slowly in the inspection game. The connected points in the upper
figures show crime and in the lower figures inspection rates per period. The thick grey bar
in each subfigure specifies the mixed Nash equilibrium. The solid and the dashed lines
represent two different calibrations of the learning model fictitious play. Both models
assume that agents update their expect tion of crime detection and start with expectations
that match their initial behavior. The solid lines specify unilateral learning, which
assumes that agents update their expectations with the actually observed behavior of their
opponent. The dashed lines specify bilateral learning, which assumes that agents update
their expectations wi h the simulated, perfe tly adapted behavior of their opponents. The
figures show consistently that humans adapt slower than rational learning models predict.
For low punishment, crime and inspection increases less than expected and for high pun-
ishment, crime and inspection decreases less than expected.
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4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
[to come] 
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